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This paper discusses the processes of nominal and real convergence and their dependence 
on exchange rate regimes adopted in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) in the 
context  of  their  future  EMU  accession.  We  focus  our  argument  on  the  possibility  of  trade-off 
between  the  pace  of  disinflation  and  the  maintenance  of  competitiveness  and  growth.  Fixed 
nominal exchange rate shifts the burden of adjustment on to the tradable sector but whether this  
pressure results in faster restructuring and faster productivity growth or becomes a straightjacket 
for the economy is an open question. The paper implements a simple empirical assessment of 
convergence  of  inflation  to  EU  levels  and  economic  growth  of  7  CEE  economies  which  had 
adopted different exchange rate regimes in period 1993-2002. Results indicate that fixed exchange 
rates seem to have been a better tool of fighting inflation as compared to floating exchange rates 
or intermediate regimes. The presence of a fixed exchange rate has also been characterised by 
higher  real  GDP  growth  rates  implying  an  absence  of  trade-off  between  nominal  and  real 
convergence in the investigated sample. Qualifications attached to these results are discussed.  
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1.  Real and nominal convergence in the run up to EMU 1 
The  imminent  EU  accession  determines  the  long-term  exchange  rate  and  monetary  policy 
regime in the acceding countries. Nevertheless, the issues of timing of EMU entry as well as the 
interim exchange rate regime remain to be resolved. As far as the choice of regime is concerned, 
crawling pegs, free floats and pegs to currencies other than euro are considered incompatible with 
the ERM II (e.g. Solans, 2002). The euro-based currency boards are already in place in Lithuania 
and Estonia largely determining their EMU accession paths but hard-peg arrangements are less 
likely to be adopted by other acceding countries (see e.g. Rostowski, 2003). These countries have 
recently declared their broad EMU accession strategies with Hungary, Poland and Slovenia opting 
for early accessions and Czech Republic for a deferred accession. However, the timing of entry 
depends  on  the  fulfilment  of  Maastricht  criteria  and  as  such  remains  tentative.  In  addition,  a 
number of other pertinent issues such as the path of entry to ERMII or other ERMII-compatible 
regime, the levels of central parities as well as the width of the ERM band are currently open to 
debate.  
Since  the  beginning  of  the  EU  accession  process,  the  achievement  of  nominal  and  real 
convergence have been frequently considered as necessary for successful integration of CEECs 
into the EU and, subsequently, EMU. Nominal convergence pertains to convergence of certain 
macroeconomic  indicators  to  levels  ensuring  macroeconomic  stability  in  an  economically 
integrated area2. In the context of CEECs and their initially high inflation rates, convergence of 
inflation  rates  to  EU  levels  translates  into  increasing  stability  of  the  economic  environment, 
improvement of development prospects and, ultimately, more rapid growth. Hence, no trade-off 
between nominal and real convergence is expected in longer term. 
While  nominal  convergence  is  supportive  of  any  form  of  economic  integration,  it  gains  on 
importance in the context of a monetary union. Notwithstanding the nominal anchor argument in 
the  context  of  high-inflation  countries,  more  generally,  monetary  integration  of  economies  with 
substantially  different  inflation  levels  may  be  undesirable  for  both  the  entrants  and  the 
incumbents3. While it is often argued that parameters of the Maastricht criteria do not sufficiently 
account for the specificity of the CEECs’ economies (e.g. productivity growth and HBS or demand 
effects),  they  have  been  established  with  a  view  of  ensuring  the  overall  stability  of  the  single 
currency. As such, they provide the institutional benchmark for measuring nominal convergence in 
the accession countries. 
                                                  
1 Author is an economist at the OECD Secretariat but views expressed herein are those of the author and should not 
in any case be attributed to the OECD. I am grateful to Lukasz Rawdanowicz and Wojciech Paczynski for helping with 
the data. Address for correspondence: Przemyslaw.Kowalski@oecd.org 
2 Maastricht criteria include criteria on: inflation, long term nominal interest rate, budget deficit, public debt and 
exchange rate stability.  
3 The more pronounced the inflation rate heterogeneity between the members the less optimal the single monetary 
policy for any one member and thereby the less desirable and credible the single currency.   
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Real convergence, referred to as convergence of productivity and standards of living levels, is 
usually measured by decreasing differentials in per capita expenditure or income. It can occur 
through either better utilisation of productive factors or increased productivity i.e. higher intensity 
with which these factors of production are being used. While per capita income levels vary widely 
even between the existing EU members, the real convergence is one of the aims of the European 
integration. Underlying is the objective to ensure similar standards of living in all countries and 
regions of the Community. The 2004 enlargement will have no precedence in terms of wealth 
differentials between the incumbents and entrants. Low per capita incomes of accession countries 
as compared with the EU average (Table 1) are perceived as a potential source of social and 
economic costs of enlargement. Fears about the costs of integration of regions at different levels of 
development  have  already  been  a  part  of  political  debate  and  were  a  factor  in  establishing 
temporary  restrictions  on  freedom  of  movement  of  factors  of  production  (mostly  labour)  in  the 
accession negotiations.  
Table 1. GDP per capita, PPP (current international $) 
  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Poland  5,580  5,860  6,300  6,910  7,330  7,800  8,110  8,620  9,320  9,450 
Slovenia  10,500  11,110  11,600  12,480  13,080  13,740  14,190  15,280  16,530  17,130 
Slovak Republic  7,880  7,700  8,250  8,970  9,590  10,120  10,440  10,890  11,550  11,960 
Estonia  6,110  5,830  5,960  6,450  6,870  7,860  8,110  8,330  9,480  10,170 
Hungary  8,190  8,290  8,740  9,250  9,420  9,850  10,390  11,050  11,960  12,340 
Czech Republic  10,340  10,610  11,050  12,170  13,040  12,880  12,720  13,150  14,110  14,720 
Lithuania  7,090  6,060  5,610  6,050  6,500  7,070  7,450  7,370  7,930  8,470 
European Monetary Union  18,061  18,120  18,888  19,883  20,295  20,627  21,077  22,020  23,546  23,942 
Source: WB Development Indicators   
In fact, no explicit real convergence criteria for EMU membership have been articulated. While 
the stability of the EMU is said to depend on “a high degree of sustainable convergence”4 the real 
component of this convergence is understood as the synchronicity of business cycles rather than 
convergence of per capita income levels (e.g. Welteke, 2001). 
Notwithstanding the ultimate obligation to fulfil the Maastricht criteria, the single most important 
objective underlying the choice of exchange rate / monetary policy framework in the run-up to 
EMU, and beyond, is economic growth. Nominal convergence, as its name suggests - “in name 
only”, is not an objective in itself and should be rather considered as a mean of facilitating the 
achievement of real convergence in the long term.  
Implications of nominal exchange rate regime for the process of nominal convergence have 
received  a  great  deal  of  attention  but  the  impact  of  a  nominal  exchange  rate  regime  on  real 
variables including growth is still an area where research does not provide clear-cut answers (see 
e.g. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2003; for Kowalski et al. 2003 for discussion of the CEECs). 
Stockman and Baxter (1989) compare the behaviour of macroeconomic variables for a sample of 
49 countries in the post-war period and except for greater exchange rate variability under floating 
exchange rate regimes find no evidence of systematic differences of macroeconomic aggregates 
                                                  
4 Article 121 of the Treaty.  
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under  alternative  exchange  rate  regimes.  Levy-Yeyati  and  Sturzenegger  (2003)  investigate  a 
sample  of 183  countries  over  the  period  1974-2000 and  find  that  while  for industrial  countries 
exchange rate regimes do not have a significant impact on growth, for developing countries less 
flexible exchange rates are associated with slower growth and with greater output volatility. 
The  mixed  results  are  partially  a  reflection  of  the  lack  of  simple  theoretical  prediction.  In 
particular, the sign of the link between exchange rate regime and growth depends on the variance-
covariance matrix of shocks affecting particular economy as well as the underlying exchange rate 
mechanism.  In  an  economy  characterised  by  a  degree  of  price  or  wage  rigidity  the  lack  of 
possibility of nominal exchange rate adjustment may result in price distortions and misallocation of 
resources in the event of shocks. On the other hand the stability of relative prices in international 
commerce associated with fixed exchange rates is likely to promote trade, investment and improve 
comparative advantage-driven allocation of resources leading to growth. 
In CEECs, perhaps more so than in more industrialised countries, exchange rate is an important 
price, firstly, because of its high flexibility relative to flexibility of domestic prices and wages and, 
secondly, due to the relatively high openness of the CEECs’ economies (see Table 1. in Rostowski, 
2003). Under conditions of liberalized capital account, a fixed exchange rate regime implies a shift of 
monetary  policy  away  from  domestic  objectives  towards  the  exchange  rate  objective.  In  such  a 
regime, other things being equal, disinflation occurs directly through the convergence of inflation rate 
in  the  tradable  sector,  and  indirectly  through  impact  of  wages  and  demand  on  inflation  in  non-
tradable sector. Nevertheless, in the event of price or wage rigidity the adjustment may happen on 
the quantity, rather than the price, side resulting in large fluctuations of output and employment5. 
While it is uncertain whether the floating exchange rate regime indeed helps in smoothing such 
fluctuations, or rather generates them, it certainly entails a possibility of such adjustment.  
There are numerous arguments in favour of fixed exchange rate regime arrangement as a 
facilitator of growth. These propositions range from the relatively old, though far from empirically 
confirmed, paradigm of benefits from certainty in international commerce to more region-specific 
arguments. Bratkowski and Rostowski (2002), for instance, point to unilateral euroization as an 
arrangement providing CEECs with financial stability in conditions of high growth-driven capital 
account surpluses.  
Overall,  however,  the  possibility  of  a  trade-off  between  the  nominal  and  real  convergence 
cannot  be  excluded  and  the  choice  of  an  exchange  rate  /  monetary  policy  framework  should 
certainly  include  assessment  of  such  risks.  In  this  paper  we  make  a  small  step  towards  this 
objective by exploring the past experience of seven CEECs with adopted exchange rate policies in 
the context of selected indicators of real and nominal convergence. Given the complexity of the 
topic, the aim of this analysis cannot be, and is not, to provide hard arguments in favour of early or 
deterred EMU accession or to discuss specific parameters of ERMII entry. Instead, we provide a 
                                                  
5 Indeed, persistent labour market problems in Poland , Slovakia and to some extent Hungary suggest the existence 
of significant structural barriers impeding adjustment.     
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reflection  on  past  experiences  with  exchange  rate  regimes  in  these  countries  which  may  be 
considered by policy makers when they are making their decisions.  
2.  Transition and exchange rate regime 
Despite similar economic and geo-political situation at the beginning of the transition, different 
economies in Central and Eastern Europe have opted for different and completely uncoordinated6 
paths of improving macroeconomic stability and growth. The Czech Republic started with a peg, 
widened  its  band  in  1996  and  proceeded  to  managed  float  in  1997.  Hungary  started  with  a 
frequently adjusted peg, adopted a crawling peg in 1995 and moved to a crawling band in 1998, so 
as to finally broaden this band to +/- 15% in 2001. Poland started with the adjustable peg in 1990, 
moved to a crawling peg in 1991, which was converted into the crawling band in 1995, bands of 
which were gradually widened in 1998-1999 finally resulting in adoption of a fully floating exchange 
rate regime in 2000. Estonia had a currency board from 1992. Lithuania and Bulgaria, on the other 
hand, started with floating rates to retreat to currency boards in 1994 and 1997 respectively.  
This  wide  range  of  choices  revealed  different  starting  points  (e.g.  availability  of  monetary 
reserves)  and  different  macroeconomic  conditions:  differentials  in  the  levels  of  credibility  of 
monetary authorities; diverse degrees of the need for effective macroeconomic stabilisation (Calvo 
and Reinhart, 2002); different initial inflation developments; or finally different structures of the real 
sector,  which  may  have  resulted  in  different  lobbying  patterns.  An  analytical  classification  of 
exchange rate regimes into floating, intermediate and fixed exchange rate regime used in this 
paper builds7 on Kowalski et al. (2003) and is included in the Annex. In practical implementation, 
the  differences  between  the  exchange  rate polices  have  been  less  pronounced.  Fixers  had  to 
change the official parity or widen the permissible bands of fluctuations and floaters frequently 
intervened in the exchange rate markets.  
For purposes of an empirical analysis a distinction between the formally declared and actual 
exchange rate regime should be made. The classification adopted here is not based on cluster 
indicator analysis as e.g. in Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) but on an ad hoc approach 
which combines the information on the formally declared and actually implemented regimes.  
Freeing up of prices in formerly centrally planned economies resulted in inflationary pressures 
on prices of goods and services for which excess demand existed under the central plan (and a 
deflationary pressure on prices of excessively supplied goods and services). Hence, inflation – 
driven initially by price liberalization and deep fiscal and monetary imbalances, and then sustained 
due to inertia and deficiency of central bank credibility – was the top priority in macroeconomic 
policy design. Nevertheless, to a certain extent the possible influence of a chosen exchange rate 
regime on both macroeconomic stability and microeconomic performance has already been then 
                                                  
6 Lavrac (1999) points out that membership of these countries in CEFTA has remained an unused opportunity to 
harmonise their exchange and monetary regimes. 
7 The modification has incorporated suggestions by a referee.   
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recognised  (see  e.g.  Lavrac,  1999).  The  choice  of  an  exchange  rate  regime,  among  other 
considerations and constraints, was driven by these countries’ different preferences towards two 
alternative goals: (a) stabilizing role of an exchange rate as a nominal anchor in the economy for 
repressing inflationary pressures and expectations and (b) equilibrating role of the real exchange 
rate  as  an  instrument  for  preserving  international  competitiveness  of  the  economy  and  for 
equilibrating the balance of payments.  
At  the  heart  of  the  nominal  anchor  argument  is  that  in  an  inflationary  environment,  profit 
margins  of  firms  competing  internationally  are  under  downward  pressure.  If  they  are  to  be 
maintained, the growth rate of wages should decelerate contributing to deceleration of inflation. In 
such a case nominal convergence can be neutral to the real growth process as the adjustment 
occurs through prices, not quantities. If on the other hand prices/wages are rigid, the adjustment 
may  occur  on  the  quantity  side  without  significant  impact  on  inflation.  The  real  outcomes, 
depending on the degree of flexibility will be probably situated in between the two cases. 
In a floating exchange rate regime the nominal exchange rate may, but does not have to, 
evolve so as to equilibrate the prices of internationally traded products. Nevertheless, the profit 
margins can theoretically be maintained without a downward pressure on wages. In such a case 
the exchange rate does not provide an anchor for domestic prices. Finally, if the nominal exchange 
rate depreciates at a rate specified by authorities (as in a crawling peg regime) a margin in favour 
of  domestic  firms  competing  in  international  markets  allows  them  to  maintain  a  degree8  of 
competitiveness given the inflationary environment. Depending on the relative dynamics of initial 
inflation  and  exchange  rate  depreciation  as  well  as  transmission  mechanisms,  such  an 
arrangement may result in a decrease or increase in inflation. 
Even though it is possible that under a nominal anchor the bulk of the adjustment may happen 
on the price side, the adjustments may not be immediate and the tradable sector may be put under 
considerable strain in the interim period. In an economy with a tradable and non-tradable sector 
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and expressed as growth rates as: 
                                                  
8 The magnitude would depend on the relative dynamics of inflation and the rate at which the currency is crawling.  
9 Such a specification implies that productivity increases are entirely internalized by firms in the form of profits and 
not real wages.   
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Equations (3) and (5) show that, assuming away productivity growth differences, in a fixed 
exchange rate regime in order for tradables profits to be unaffected, prices in the non-tradable 
sector would have to be growing at the rate equal to that of foreign tradables. If growth of prices in 
non-tradables is higher, tradable profits are reduced, ceteris paribus, through the wage mechanism 
(1). This problem will be less significant in an economy with large share of tradables (high a) 10 
which is similar to the observation about the role of openness for the choice of an exchange rate 
regime made by McKinnon(1963).  
In a floating exchange rate regime the nominal exchange rate can adjust so that profitability of 
the  tradable  sector  is  maintained.    It  has  to  be  pointed  out  that  the  nominal  depreciation  and 
resulting  tradables  price  inflation  (4)  is  not  necessarily  detrimental  to  profitability  of  the  non-
tradable sector as the non-tradable prices are not bound by external constraints and may be more 
easily adjusted. Under such a scenario we deal with a pass-through of nominal depreciation into 
domestic prices but no effect on profitability of either tradable or non-tradable sector. 
Hence,  especially  in  an  environment  characterised  by  a  degree  of  inflationary  inertia,  the 
nominal  exchange  rate  may  be  an  important  tool  of  preserving  competitiveness  or  smoothing 
fluctuations. Of course, as (5) indicates, exogenous productivity growth may compensate or even 
outweigh the negative effects without undermining the argument that profits may be affected by 
behaviour of nominal exchange rate. It is also clear that a crawling peg, provides a margin of extra 
profitability for the tradable sector while also generating or sustaining inflation.  
The mechanism described above provides a rough intuition of how profits, especially in the 
tradable sector, may be affected. This, however, prompts a further question of how this may feed 
into the productivity growth. As Lafrance and Schembri (2000) point out both the exchange rate 
and productivity depend on a large set of underlying factors and a simple causal relationship is 
unlikely. However, the traditional assumption of productivity being exogenous to nominal exchange 
rate regime (see e.g. Harris, 2001) is not fully realistic. The Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson is the most 
famous theoretical framework that is based on this assumption. A competing paradigm is related to 
                                                  
10 In our framework this is modeled through parameter a, which describes the weight of tradables in the price index 
P (Equation 1).   
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our discussion in previous paragraphs and posits that under nominal rigidities nominal exchange 
rate  behaviour  may  impact  upon  profit  margins  and  investment  and  thereby  affect  productivity 
growth. One variation of this paradigm is that of the exchange-rate-sheltering which suggests that 
a depreciating exchange rate protects competitiveness of firms resulting in slow productivity growth 
(see Lafrance and Schembri (2000) for a discussion of Canada’s case). An alternative hypothesis 
states that a positive stimulus to profit margin is likely to result in higher investment and thereby 
more rapid productivity growth. 
The  exchange-rate-sheltering  hypothesis  posits  that  a  depreciating  exchange  rate  protects 
firms from external competitive pressure, like a tariff, and thus removes the incentive to make 
productivity  enhancing  investments.  An  implicit  assumption  in  this  kind  of  reasoning  is  the 
“satisficng behaviour”11 of the managers who are seeking a quiet life rather then maximising firms’ 
profits. As Lafrance and Schembri (2000) point out this is only possible if the shareholders are 
inattentive to the value of the firm and capital and product markets are not functioning effectively12. 
The  reverse  side  of  the  exchange-rate-sheltering  hypothesis  is  the  hypothesis  of  productivity 
enhancing restructuring or creative destruction where firms or industries increase their productivity 
in periods when they are faced with though competitive conditions.  
Overall, the analysis suggests a possibility of a trade-off between the pace of disinflation and 
the pace of economic growth and its connection to the choice of an exchange rate regime. If 
product and labour markets are, or can become, flexible such trade-off may not arise. If, on the 
other hand, prices are sluggish, the tradable sector may be particularly vulnerable. Whether this 
additional  pressure  results  in  faster  restructuring  and  faster  productivity  growth  or  becomes  a 
straightjacket for the economy is an open question.  
 3.  Convergence under different exchange rate regimes - empirical 
findings 
In this context, the remainder of the paper provides an assessment of the impact of an adopted 
exchange rates regime on nominal convergence and growth rates for a panel of seven CEECs13 in 
period 1993Q1-2002Q4.  
 
Inflation rates 
Following Kocenda (2001) who applied similar methodology to an investigation of convergence 
of a number of macroeconomic indicators within a group of CEECs, we model the convergence of 
rates of CPI inflation, tradables and non-tradables inflation to the EU equivalents.  
 
                                                  
11 Original term used after Lafrance and Schembri (2000). 
12 This is not an unrealistic assumption in transition economies. 
13 Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovak Republic and Hungary.  
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Convergence to an equivalent EU indicator is expressed as: 
 
(6)  ( ) it EUt it EUt it u X X X X + - = - - - 1 1 f  
 
where Xit is the variable of interest in country i (EU denotes European Union) in period t.  
 
The above equation describes a time path of a “distance” of respective variable in a given CEE 
economy to the EU level. Convergence (divergence) requires these differentials to be smaller over 
time and is realised if the estimated coefficient φ <1 (>1). Low estimated φ in (6) implies rapid 
nominal convergence to the EU levels.  
We focus on three measures of nominal convergence: CPI inflation, tradable prices inflation 
(and non-tradable prices inflation). While, apart from CPI inflation, these indicators do not directly 
correspond to Maastricht criteria they are consistent with the framework presented in the first part 
of the paper.  
It has to be pointed out that the estimation of (6) is of purely “statistical” character and is not 
underpinned by any particular convergence theory. Nevertheless, it allows us to empirically verify 
the  evidence  for  systematic  differences  in  rates  of  nominal  convergence  between  adopted 
exchange rates regimes. 
In order to remove the problem of unit roots in the investigated time-series, equation (6) is 
transformed into the Dickey-Fuller specification.  
 

















In fact, we estimate (7) and test the significance of ρ as in the standard Dickey Fuller test. 
Statistical significance of ρ implies convergence if the resulting f  coefficients is smaller than 1. 
The above econometric framework is implemented using an unbalanced panel data set containing 
information  on  7  CEECs  in  period  1993q1  to  2002q4.  The  structure  of  the  data  allows  us  for 
estimation of (7) for: (i) all countries; (ii) separate countries in the sample and (iii) various adopted 
exchange rate regimes.  
The results are discussed focusing on estimations of (ii) and (iii). Panel estimations of (iii) are 
performed using feasible generalized least squares controlling for heteroskedasticity across panels 
and autocorrelation within panels (FGLS). Individual country estimations are OLS. As constant 
term has no interpretation in the context of (7) none of the estimations includes a constant. 
  




As consistent data on levels of productivity across the sample is not available, the measures of 
real  convergence  adopted  are  quarterly  year-on-year  seasonally  adjusted  growth  rates  of  real 
GDP. As is implied by the current GDP per capita differences between the EU and CEECs (see 
Table 1) convergence in income levels requires that the rates of growth are considerably higher in 
the  CEECs.  Effectively,  the  question  of  real  convergence  in  the  CEECs  is  a  question  of  fast 
growth. Therefore, in the real convergence part of this empirical exercise, we follow Levy-Yeyati 
and  Sturzenegger  (2003)  and  perform  an  estimation  of  a  standard  specification  of  the  growth 
regression  augmented  with  exchange  rate  regime  dummies.  As  far  as  other  growth-explaining 
variables are concerned, in addition to initial per capita GDP level and the share of gross capital 
formation to GDP we include the share of FDI inflows in GDP to capture the role of foreign capital 
and technology transfer, the share of general government final consumption in GDP to capture the 
extent  of  state  intervention  and  share  of  exports  in  goods  and  services  to  capture  outward 
orientation of the economy. In addition, we include the contemporary inflation level in order to 
capture the stage of disinflation process.  
 
The estimated equation takes the form: 
 
(8)  ) , , , , , , , ( 1993 C FIX FLOAT GGFC EX FDI GFCF GDPPC f GDP it it it it i it = D  
where: 
 
GDPit     - seasonally adjusted year–on-year real GDP growth rate (Source: national accounts) 
GDPPCi1993  - per capita GDP level in 1993 (Source: WB) 
GFCFit    - percentage share of gross fixed capital formation in GDP (Source: WB) 
FDIit     - percentage share of FDI inflows in GDP (Source: WB) 
EXit     - percentage share of exports in GDP (Source: WB) 
GGFCit    - percentage share of government final consumption in GDP (Source: WB) 
FLOAT   - dummy for a floating exchange rate regime (Source: see Annex) 
FIX     - dummy for a fixed exchange rate regime (Source: see Annex) 
INFit    - inflation level   
C     - constant among others picking up the effect of an intermediate exchange rage regime  
 
The  equation  is  estimated  on  a  panel  of  seven  CEECs  in  period  1q1993-4q2002.  The 
estimations are performed with three different types of estimators: (i) feasible generalized least 
squares  estimators  controlling  for  heteroskedasticity  across  panels  and  autocorrelation  within 
panels (FGLS), (ii) fixed effects estimator with robust standard errors (FE) and (iii) random effects 




Using the methodology described above we aim to establish some facts about the dynamics of 
nominal and real convergence in the context of adopted exchange rate regimes in period 1993 – 
2002 and to reconcile these facts with theoretical analysis. Results are reported in Tables 1-11 in 
the Annex.  
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Prior to the discussion of results it has to be stressed that the regime classification included in 
the Annex is to some extent arbitrary. First of all, classification of Slovakian and Czech fixed but 
adjustable regimes at the beginning of the period as fixed, and thereby analytically equivalent to 
currency boards in Estonia and Lithuania, may be considered problematic. Secondly, the current 
exchange rate regime in Slovakia is classified as managed floating according to the IMF definition 
and as floating in our classification.  
Secondly, the incidence of fixed exchange rates is concentrated at the beginning of the sample 
and  the  incidence  of  the  floating  exchange  rates  at  the  end  of  the  sample.  This  poses  some 
problems with interpretation of the exchange coefficient estimates for the exchange rate dummies 
in the growth regression. In particular, we may be picking up effects characteristic for the beginning 
of  transition  process  (in  the  case  of  fixed  exchange  rate  regime  dummy)  and  later  stages  of 
transition (in the case of floating exchange rate regime dummy). To address these concerns we 
include the inflation rate to capture the impact of inflation on growth directly but also to account for 
the  stage  of  the  disinflation  process.  This  variable  proves  to  be  an  important  and  statistically 
significant explanation of growth patterns with high inflation periods characterised by significantly 
lower growth rates. In addition, robustness checks with time trend and a variable measuring the 
time since the establishment of an independent central bank were performed. These specifications 
yield insignificant results on trend variables (also when raised to various powers) in the growth 
regression. We do not report these results. 
Overall, despite these robustness checks, our sample is fairly limited both in time and across 
countries. The frequent regime changes introduce further fragmentation of the sample: floating 
exchange rate regimes are observed in three countries (Czech republic, Poland and Slovakia) and 
mostly  in  the  second  half  of  the  investigated  period  and  fixed  exchange  rate  regimes  are 
dominated by currency boards in Estonia and Lithuania as well as “fixed but adjustable regimes” in 
Slovakia and Czech Republic at the beginning of the sample. Therefore, the results presented 
should be treated with appropriate caution.  
As far as nominal convergence is concerned the estimations are reported for convergence of 
CPI inflation, tradable price index inflation and non-tradable price index inflation to the equivalent 
EU indicators. In a country by country estimation, the incidence of convergence to EU CPI inflation 
rates is reported for Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia with the first two countries 
displaying  the  fastest  rates  of  convergence.  For  Hungary  and  Czech  Republic  the  adopted 
methodology yields statistically insignificant results implying that in the investigated period certain 
inertia in inflation was observed.  
Statistical properties of obtained estimates improve considerably if CPI inflation convergence is 
estimated for three panels which extract observations for three different adopted exchange rate 
regimes (Annex 1). Results for all three regimes are significant at 5% level. The estimated 95% 
confidence intervals for the convergence coefficient Ф suggest that the fixed exchange rate regime 
was characterised by the fastest convergence of CPI inflation to the EU level. Countries which 
adopted the intermediate exchange rate regime have been converging much more slowly. Finally,  
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while for the floating exchange rate regime panel the estimated coefficient is statistically significant, 
the  95%  confidence  interval  for  the  convergence  coefficient  Ф  suggest  a  possibility  of  no 
convergence.  
As far as convergence of tradable prices inflation to the EU levels is concerned results for 
Estonia and Slovakia suggest convergence. Results for Poland are also statistically significant but 
given the confidence interval divergence is a possibility. The panel results for the three exchange 
rate  regime  are  again  more  robust  statistically.  The  fixed  and  the  intermediate  regimes  were 
characterised  by  the  most  rapid  convergence  of  tradables  inflation  to  the  EU  level.  Floating 
exchange  rate  regime  recorded  a  statistically  significant  result  but  the  upper  band  of  the 
confidence interval suggested a possibility of divergence. The country results for the non-tradable 
sector inflation suggest convergence only in the case of Lithuania. Panel estimations by regime 
suggest a statistically significant convergence under fixed exchange rates and to a lesser extent in 
the floating exchange rate regime while the intermediate exchange rate regime is characterised by 
insignificant results. 
Overall, in the investigated period the fixed exchange rate regime was characterised by the 
fastest  convergence  of  all  three  inflation  measures.  There  is  no  evidence  that  the  floating 
exchange rate regime has speeded up the inflation convergence. Interestingly, this seems to have 
been driven by lack of convergence in tradable goods inflation which outweighed the convergence 
of non-tradable goods inflation. The evidence for convergence of price inflation in the intermediate 
exchange rate regime is mixed: the tradables inflation was converging but non-tradables inflation 
was not. 
The results for the estimated growth equation (8) are reported in Tables 7-11. Overall, roughly 
40 per cent of the variation in the GDP growth rates is explained by this specification. Firstly, the 
estimated results indicate lack of evidence of beta convergence14 in the analysed period. This is 
not surprising given the long–term nature of this concept and the shortness of our sample. It is 
worth observing that all estimators yield economically plausible signs of influence on growth rates 
with share of gross capital formation, exports and FDI inflows in GDP having positive impact on 
growth and the share of general government final consumption GDP having a negative impact. 
However,  the  statistical  significance  of  coefficients  estimated  with  some  estimators  is  not  very 
robust. We obtain statistically significant impact of exports’ share on growth in the FGLS estimator 
with heteroscedastic panels and FE estimator with robust standard errors as well as significantly 
negative  influence  of  government  consumption  with  the  FGLS  estimator  with  heteroscedastic 
panels. 
The  results  on  inflation  rates  and  exchange  rate  regimes  stand  out  by  their  statistical 
significance across various applied estimators. One extra percentage point of year-on-year inflation 
                                                  
14 Conditional beta convergence applies if the growth rate of real per capita GDP is negatively related to the starting 
level of real per capita GDP after holding fixed some other variables such as initial levels of human capital, measures of 
government policies, the propensity to save etc. (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995).  
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is estimated to diminish the quarterly year-on-year real GDP growth, depending on the estimator, 
by 0.4 to 0.8 percentage points.  
The statistical properties of coefficients on exchange rate regime dummies are robust, and 
consistent with respect to signs, across different estimators. The contributions of exchange rate 
regime  dummies  are  surprisingly  high.  The  fact  of  having  a  fixed  exchange  rate  regime  is 
associated with having on average 1.37 to 4.76 percentage points higher quarterly year-on-year 
growth rates. The fact of having a floating exchange rate regime is associated with having on 
average 1.71 to 2.89 percentage points lower growth rates. As discussed above, given the small 
data  sample  fragmented  further  by  observed  exchange  rate  regime  changes,  such  significant 
contributions to growth rates associated with particular regimes have to be treated with caution.  
On the one hand, it is possible that the results reflect an exogenous to regimes high growth in 
the early stage of transition when fixed or pegged regimes prevailed and lower growth later on 
when  more  flexible  exchange  rate  regimes  were  adopted.  However,  this  is,  as  discussed  in 
preceding sections, not an exclusive explanation. In fact, as we argued above it is plausible that in 
an  inflationary  environment  the  discipline  of  a  fixed  exchange  rate  triggers  productivity  growth 
which becomes the only way of maintaining competitiveness. Later on when inflation is reduced 
the benefits of earlier productivity advancements are fully realized. In addition, in the absence of 
external flexibility, flexibility has to be ensured domestically and domestic institutions have to be 
reformed more quickly. This, in turn, creates a better environment for future growth.  
4.  Conclusions 
This  paper  discussed  the  processes  of  nominal  and  real  convergence  in  the  context  of 
exchange rate regimes adopted in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). We focused 
our argument on the theoretical possibility of trade-off between the pace of disinflation process and 
the maintenance of competitiveness and growth. We argued that while stabilisation based on fixed 
nominal exchange rate may shift the burden of adjustment on to the tradable sector, this additional 
pressure  may  result  in  faster  restructuring  and  more  rapid  productivity  growth  or  become  a 
straightjacket for the economy.  
The presented simple empirical assessment of convergence of inflation rates and growth rates 
of 7 CEE economies which had adopted different exchange rate regimes in period 1993-2002 
suggests  that  fixed  exchange  rates  seem  to  have  been  a  better  tool  of  fighting  inflation  as 
compared to floating exchange rates or intermediate regimes. In addition, fixed rates have also 
been characterised by higher real GDP growth rates suggesting no presence of trade-off between 
nominal and real convergence in the investigated sample. In fact, these results are consistent with 
the long-term prediction of positive relationship between low inflation and growth. 
While, as discussed in the main body of the paper, these results should be treated with some 
caution, they do provide a point of reference for the discussion of the EMU accession. Overall, the 
presented discussion and results suggest that the risk of a trade-off between the nominal and real  
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convergence  may  be  smaller  in  Central  and  Eastern  European  countries  than  sometimes 
suggested and that hard pegs may be an attractive option for achievement of both nominal and 
real goals. The constraint of a credibly fixed exchange rate is likely to trigger productivity growth 
which becomes the only effective way of ensuring competitiveness. In addition, in the absence of 
external flexibility, flexibility has to be ensured domestically and institutions have to be reformed 
more quickly than would otherwise be the case. This, in turn, creates a better environment for 
future growth.  
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Annex. Classification of exchange rate systems, 1Q94-4Q02  
  Czech 
Republic  Estonia  Hungary  Lithuania  Poland  Slovakia  Slovenia 
Q11994  0  0  0.5  …  …  0  … 
Q21994  0  0  0.5  …  …  0  … 
Q31994  0  0  0.5  …  …  0  … 
Q41994  0  0  0.5  …  …  0  … 
Q11995  0  0  0.5  0  0.5  0  0.5 
Q21995  0  0  0.5  0  0.5  0  0.5 
Q31995  0  0  0.5  0  0.5  0  0.5 
Q41995  0  0  0.5  0  0.5  0  0.5 
Q11996  0  0  0.5  0  0.5  0  0.5 
Q21996  0.5  0  0.5  0  0.5  0  0.5 
Q31996  0.5  0  0.5  0  0.5  0  0.5 
Q41996  0.5  0  0.5  0  0.5  0  0.5 
Q11997  0.5  0  0.5  0  0.5  0  0.5 
Q21997  0.5  0  0.5  0  0.5  0  0.5 
Q31997  1  0  0.5  0  0.5  0  0.5 
Q41997  1  0  0.5  0  0.5  0  0.5 
Q11998  1  0  0.5  0  0.5  0  0.5 
Q21998  1  0  0.5  0  0.5  0  0.5 
Q31998  1  0  0.5  0  0.5  0  0.5 
Q41998  1  0  0.5  0  0.5  1  0.5 
Q11999  1  0  0.5  0  0.5  1  0.5 
Q21999  1  0  0.5  0  0.5  1  0.5 
Q31999  1  0  0.5  0  0.5  1  0.5 
Q41999  1  0  0.5  0  0.5  1  0.5 
Q12000  1  0  0.5  0  0.5  1  0.5 
Q22000  1  0  0.5  0  1  1  0.5 
Q32000  1  0  0.5  0  1  1  0.5 
Q42000  1  0  0.5  0  1  1  0.5 
Q12001  1  0  0.5  0  1  1  0.5 
Q22001  1  0  0.5  0  1  1  0.5 
Q32001  1  0  0.5  0  1  1  0.5 
Q42001  1  0  0.5  0  1  1  0.5 
Q12002  1  0  0.5  0  1  1  0.5 
Q22002  1  0  0.5  0  1  1  0.5 
Q32002  1  0  0.5  0  1  1  0.5 
Q42002  1  0  0.5  0  1  1  0.5 
Notes: ‘0’ denotes fixed exchange rate regime, ‘0.5’ – intermediate regime, ‘1’ – floating regime. 
Source: Classification  based on declared de jure and observed de facto regimes.  
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Table 1. CPI inflation rate convergence by country 
***,**,* denote significance at 1,5 and 10% rescpectively, DF critical values at 1,5,10% respectively -2.63, -1.95, -1.61 
Table 2. CPI inflation rate convergence by regime 
regime  ρ     Implied Ф z-statistic  95% conf. 
interval 
Implied Ф 95% conf, 
interval 
No. of  
observations 
Floating  -0,11  ***  0,89  -1,23  -0,05  0,03  0,95  1,03  35 
Intermediate  -0,04  **  0,96  -2,27  -0,07  -0,01  0,93  0,99  35 
Fixed  -0,16  ***  0,84  -6,80  -0,21  -0,12  0,79  0,88  35 
***,**,* denote significance at 1,5 and 10% rescpectively 
Table 3. Tradables inflation rate convergence by country 
country  ρ     Implied Ф t-statistic  95% conf. interval  Implied Ф 95% conf, 
interval 
No. of  
observations 
CZE  -0,14    0,86  -1,57  -0,33  0,04  0,67  1,04  35 
EST  -0,15  **  0,85  -2,56  -0,26  -0,03  0,74  0,97  35 
HUN  -0,15    0,85  -1,65  -0,33  0,03  0,67  1,03  35 
LIT  -0,13    0,87  -1,43  -0,32  0,06  0,68  1,06  35 
POL  -0,15  *  0,85  -1,72  -0,33  0,03  0,67  1,03  35 
SLK  -0,28  **  0,72  -2,27  -0,54  -0,03  0,46  0,97  35 
SLO  -0,15     0,85  -1,65  -0,33  0,03  0,67  1,03  35 
***,**,* denote significance at 1,5 and 10% rescpectively 
Table 4. Tradables inflation rate convergence by regime 
regime  ρ     Implied Ф z-statistic  95% conf. 
interval 
Implied Ф 95% conf, 
interval 
No. of  
observations 
Floating  -0,16  ***  0,84  -2,75  -0,05  0,03  0,95  1,03  65 
Intermediate  -0,23  ***  0,77  -3,03  -0,38  -0,08  0,62  0,92  76 
Fixed  -0,14  ***  0,86  -3,44  -0,22  -0,06  0,78  0,94  80 
***,**,* denote significance at 1,5 and 10% rescpectively 
country  ρ    Implied Ф t-statistic  95% conf. interval  Implied Ф 95% conf, 
interval 
No. of  
observations 
CZE  -0,05    0,95  -1,23  -0,14  0,03  0,86  1,03  35 
EST  -0,07  ***  0,93  -3,12  -0,12  -0,03  0,88  0,97  35 
HUN  -0,02    0,98  -0,97  -0,05  0,02  0,95  1,02  35 
LIT  -0,25  ***  0,75  -8,40  -0,30  -0,19  0,70  0,81  35 
POL  -0,05  ***  0,95  -3,22  -0,08  -0,02  0,92  0,98  35 
SLK  -0,08  *  0,92  -1,73  -0,16  0,01  0,84  1,01  35 
SLO  -0,05  **  0,95  -2,36  -0,10  -0,01  0,90  0,99  35  
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Table 5. Non-tradables inflation rate convergence by country 
country  ρ     Implied Ф t-statistic  95% conf. interval  Implied Ф 95% conf, 
interval 
No. of  
observations 
CZE  -0,09  **  0,91  -1,76  -0,20  0,01  0,80  1,01  31 
EST  -0,07    0,93  -1,32  -0,17  0,04  0,83  1,04  35 
HUN  -0,02    0,98  -0,51  -0,11  0,07  0,89  1,07  35 
LIT  -0,14  ***  0,86  -2,84  -0,24  -0,04  0,76  0,96  27 
POL  -0,06    0,94  -1,36  -0,16  0,03  0,84  1,03  27 
SLK  -0,14  **  0,86  -1,79  -0,29  0,02  0,71  1,02  31 
SLO  -0,02     0,98  -0,51  -0,11  0,07  0,89  1,07  35 
***,**,* denote significance at 1,5 and 10% rescpectively 
Table 6. Non-tradables inflation rate convergence by regime 
regime  ρ     Implied Ф z-statistic  95% conf. 
interval 
Implied Ф 95% conf, 
interval 
No. of  
observations 
Floating  -0,11  ***  0,89  -3,07  -0,18  -0,04  0,82  0,96  65 
Intermediate  -0,04    0,96  -0,94  -0,11  0,04  0,89  1,04  76 
Fixed  -0,11  ***  0,89  -4,20  -0,16  -0,06  0,84  0,94  80 
***,**,* denote significance at 1,5 and 10% rescpectively 
Table 7. Growth equation estimated with FGLS 
   Coef.  Std. Err.  z  P>|z|  [95% Conf.  Interval] 
GFCF  0,13  0,06  2,26  0,02  0,02  0,24 
FDI  0,15  0,10  1,49  0,14  -0,05  0,36 
EX  -0,03  0,02  -1,47  0,14  -0,07  0,01 
GGFC  -0,07  0,07  -1,09  0,28  -0,21  0,06 
GDPPC  0,00  0,00  2,26  0,02  0,00  0,00 
FLOAT  -2,89  0,73  -3,94  0,00  -4,33  -1,46 
FIX  1,37  0,73  1,88  0,06  -0,06  2,80 
INF  -6,40  2,16  -2,97  0,00  -10,63  -2,17 
C  1,68  1,78  0,94  0,35  -1,82  5,17 
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Table 8. Growth equation estimated with FGLS with heteroscedastic panels 
   Coef.  Std. Err.  z  P>|z|  [95% Conf.  Interval] 
GFCF  0,03  0,04  0,62  0,53  -0,06  0,11 
FDI  0,05  0,09  0,57  0,57  -0,12  0,22 
EX  -0,03  0,02  -1,71  0,09  -0,06  0,00 
GGFC  -0,10  0,04  -2,30  0,02  -0,19  -0,02 
GDPPC  0,00  0,00  3,19  0,00  0,00  0,00 
FLOAT  -2,29  0,63  -3,62  0,00  -3,53  -1,05 
FIX  2,42  0,55  4,40  0,00  1,34  3,50 
INF  -8,54  2,55  -3,35  0,00  -13,54  -3,55 
C  5,26  1,66  3,17  0,00  2,00  8,52 
Table 9. Growth equation estimated with FGLS with heteroscedastic panels and autocorrelation 
within panels 
   Coef.  Std. Err.  z  P>|z|  [95% Conf.  Interval] 
GFCF  0,06  0,06  1,10  0,27  -0,05  0,17 
FDI  0,03  0,09  0,38  0,71  -0,14  0,21 
EX  -0,01  0,02  -0,46  0,65  -0,06  0,04 
GGFC  -0,08  0,07  -1,14  0,25  -0,22  0,06 
GDPPC  0,00  0,00  1,55  0,12  0,00  0,00 
FLOAT  -1,71  0,80  -2,12  0,03  -3,28  -0,13 
FIX  2,36  0,75  3,15  0,00  0,89  3,83 
INF  -4,84  2,67  -1,81  0,07  -10,08  0,39 
C  2,65  2,12  1,25  0,21  -1,49  6,80 
Table 10. Growth equation estimated with FE with robust standard errors   
   Coef.  Std. Err.  t  P>|t|  [95% Conf.  Interval] 
GFCF  0,18  0,12  1,49  0,14  -0,06  0,42 
FDI  0,16  0,16  1,05  0,29  -0,14  0,47 
EX  0,13  0,03  4,03  0,00  0,07  0,20 
GGFC  -0,05  0,32  -0,16  0,87  -0,69  0,59 
GDPPC  (dropped)           
FLOAT  -2,66  0,53  -5,07  0,00  -3,70  -1,62 
FIX  4,76  1,30  3,65  0,00  2,19  7,33 
INF  -4,93  1,63  -3,03  0,00  -8,14  -1,72 
C  -9,56  7,13  -1,34  0,18  -23,62  4,50 
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Table 11. Growth equation estimated with random effects     
dgdp  Coef.  Std. Err.  z  P>|z|  [95% Conf.  Interval] 
GFCF  0,13  0,06  2,21  0,03  0,01  0,24 
FDI  0,15  0,11  1,45  0,15  -0,05  0,36 
EX  -0,03  0,02  -1,44  0,15  -0,07  0,01 
GGFC  -0,07  0,07  -1,07  0,29  -0,21  0,06 
GDPPC  0,00  0,00  2,21  0,03  0,00  0,00 
FLOAT  -2,89  0,75  -3,85  0,00  -4,36  -1,42 
FIX  1,37  0,75  1,83  0,07  -0,09  2,84 
INF  -6,40  2,21  -2,90  0,00  -10,73  -2,07 
C  1,68  1,82  0,92  0,36  -1,90  5,25 
 
 